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Observation One - Inherency
====A. The US focus on illegal immigration has caused the neglect of economic engagement at legitimate border crossings – current investment at points of entry between the US and Mexico is woefully inadequate.====

Bloomberg News May 2013

“Border Delays Cost U.S. $7.8 Billion as Fence Is Focus” By Amanda J. Crawford 5/14/13 []

U.S. investment has remained focused on controlling the rest of the border between the crossings, including remote areas such as the Arizona desert. In the past decade, the number of Border Patrol agents more than doubled while the number of Customs and Border Protection officers, who staff the ports of entry, has remained at about the same level, according to a report by the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute and partner institutions. Congressional funding for the areas between the ports has eclipsed that for the authorized entry points since 2007, even though the crossings have faced enhanced security requirements, increasing trade and evidence that drugs and dangerous individuals are more likely to cross there, according to the Mexico Institute report. That focus continues in the current immigration debate in the Senate. The plan crafted by the so-called Gang of Eight bipartisan senators, which is being considered by the Judiciary Committee today, aims to secure Republican support by tying immigrants’ path to citizenship to the ability of the U.S. Border Patrol to stop 90 percent of illegal traffic across the southern border between the official ports of entry. There is no similar metric for the efficiency or security of the land ports. ‘Less Attention ’ “The way the border is currently run is costing the U.S. a lot in terms of jobs and the economy,” said Christopher Wilson, an associate with the Mexico Institute and co-author of his group’s report on border trade. “In the context of the current immigration debate, we are very focused on what is going on between the ports of entry while this major issue, which is about security but also about jobs and the economy, is getting a lot less attention.” Focusing politically on the rest of the border is easier than facing the challenges of running effective ports of entry, said Steven Camarota, director of research for the Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington-based group critical of increased immigration. While the land ports probably do need more investment in infrastructure, there also should be much more stringent security, including entry and exit checks to catch those who overstay legal visits, he said. “It seems to some extent we put too much emphasis on the ease of movement across the border,” Camarota said. “The border is not simply an obstacle to be overcome by businesses and travelers. It is the part where our country begins, and it is vitally important for security and immigration control.” Modernizing Ports Modernizing land ports of entry, which average more than 40 years old and were built before the increased security requirements implemented after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, would cost $6 billion according to a 2011 Customs and Border Protection report. About half of that cost would be for the southern border, according to the Bloomberg Government analysis. The Senate bill includes funding for 3,500 additional Customs officers and earmarks $6.5 billion for border security. With the bill’s metrics tied to security elsewhere on the border, though, that’s where most of the money will probably go, Hummer said. “Achieving the security metrics in the Gang of Eight bill will likely divert funds away from land ports of entry,” Hummer said. Truck Crossing More than 5.1 million trucks crossed the border at the six largest commercial ports of entry in 2012, up from about 2.9 million in 1995 and expected to swell to more than 7.3 million by 2020, according to the Bloomberg Government analysis. Over the last decade, the inflation-adjusted value of goods transported by truck through the southern border grew from $205 billion to $322 billion, Hummer said. The average wait for commercial vehicles at the southern border is just over an hour and much longer at peak times of day, Hummer said. His analysis included additional costs of fuel and driver wages as well as lost business opportunities. Five industries that account for 66 percent of trade value between the countries -- electrical machinery, computer devices, vehicles, plastics and precision health instruments --shouldered most of the costs of the border delays. The delays could increase the costs of consumer electronics and complicate supply chains for automakers, including Honda, Nissan, Mazda and Audi, which have announced increased production in Mexico, according to the report. Automakers often ship parts across the southern border several times during manufacturing, causing costs to add up. Economic Ties The value of the economic ties between the U.S. and Mexico has been lost in the immigration debate amid calls by some members of Congress to fence the entire length of the nearly 2,000-mile border, said Benjamin Johnson, executive director of the American Immigration Council, a pro-immigration group based in Washington. The council’s Immigration Policy Center published a paper last week on the importance of trade between the countries called “Lost in the Shadow of the Fence.” “We talk about fences, we talk about all kinds of security measures and almost never is there a discussion of how do you improve the incredibly valuable crossings in terms of trade and people that happen at the border,” Johnson said.

A. Continued blockages at the border will suffocate both the US and Mexican economies.
Farnsworth, 2013

Eric Farnsworth heads the Washington office of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, “Obama’s Mexico Trip Yielded Progress, Missed Opportunities,” Briefing, World Politics Review http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12934/obama-s-mexico-trip-yielded-progress-missed-opportunities

The two presidents should also have had more to say about the border, particularly regarding updating and expanding the infrastructure there that is creaking under the weight of increased trade and tightened security. The border is the windpipe of U.S.-Mexico trade. If it is blocked, both nations will choke. If it is cleared and expanded, both nations’ economies can breathe. The U.S.-Mexico energy relationship should also have received much more attention than it did, especially the export of newly plentiful natural gas from the United States, though this might have opened up both leaders to criticism about a lack of progress, whether on the transboundary agreement or the pace and scale of energy reform in Mexico. Meanwhile, bilateral security and drug-trafficking issues have not gone away. The Pena Nieto government is working to reformulate policies it inherited from the administration of former President Felipe Calderon. Only time will tell if Pena Nieto’s new, more centralized approach is more or less effective. But no matter how much Obama and Pena Nieto attempt to shift perceptions of the relationship from security to economic ties, the security issues will continue to grab headlines until they are effectively addressed. And that will hurt the economic agenda, because perceptions of insecurity in Mexico are a drag on both investment and the willingness of entrepreneurs to bet on Mexico, despite some promising steps toward innovation and building an entrepreneurial spirit in Mexico. Of course, the failure of the United States to control the export of weapons to Mexico directly contributes to Mexico’s persistent security problems. So we have a scenario in which the United States, in working to redefine the relationship from security to trade and economics, is reluctant to export natural gas but unable to prevent the export of assault weapons to Mexico. At the same time, Obama and Pena Nieto met during a time of real political crisis in Venezuela, even as the quality of democracy is deteriorating in a number of countries across the region. As the increasingly untenable concept of a regional democratic consensus comes unglued, the Summit of the Americas process becomes less and less relevant. It would have been electrifying in this context for the two presidents to call for a North American leaders meeting, to which could then be invited the leaders of the nations of the Pacific Alliance, a Mexico-inspired grouping of economically like-minded nations in the Americas, to regenerate a broader hemispheric agenda based on the reality, not just the rhetoric, of shared values and common interests. The president’s visit to Mexico was timely and symbolically important. It was designed to shift the narrative about U.S.-Mexico relations, and several concrete initiatives were announced. But the trip seemingly did little to promote or capture a larger ambition for the relationship. Both sides will need to think bigger to take the relationship to the next level.

B. Effective and efficient border crossings are key to US exports to Mexico – these are a crucial lynchpin to stimulate renewed US job growth.
O’Neil 2013

Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 []

Surprising to many Americans is the importance of the United States’ trade with Mexico. While Asia captures the headlines, U.S. exports to Mexico are double those to China, and second only to Canada. And while many of these goods come from border states—Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California— Mexico matters for much more of the union. Seventeen states send more than 10 percent of their exports to Mexico, and it is the number one or two destination for U.S. goods for nearly half the country. The graph below shows those states most economically dependent on our southern neighbor–notice that South Dakota and Nebraska outpace New Mexico and California. These flows are //only accelerating//. During the first ten months of 2012 exports heading south grew by $17 billion dollars (or 10 percent) compared to 2011, reaching a total of $181 billion. They include petroleum products (some $17 billion worth) and intermediate goods such as vehicle parts, electrical apparatuses, industrial supplies, metals, and chemicals (over $40 billion combined). Spurred on by deep supply chains, these pieces and parts move fluidly back and forth across the border (often quite a few times) before ending up as finished goods on store shelves in both countries. The uptick should be seen as a good thing. According to economic studies, these exports support some six million American jobs (directly and indirectly). But to continue this dynamism, the U nited S tates and Mexico need to improve border infrastructure and facilitate flows. This means expanding border crossings and highways, and harmonizing regulations and customs to make the process easier and faster. Prioritizing and investing in bilateral trade will provide greater opportunity and security–for U.S. companies and workers alike.

C. Global economic collapse causes war.
Harris and Burrows, 9 –


 * counselor in the National Intelligence Council, the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025, **member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, Washington Quarterly, [] )**


 * Increased Potential for Global Conflict¶ Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies ( think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier.¶ In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn .¶ The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East **__.__** Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.¶ Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts , such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

Advantage Two – US Mexico Relations
====A. Despite the growing importance of US-Mexico relations, new BILATERAL initiatives are necessary to jump start improvements – improving the movement of people and goods is the key location for dialogue.====

O’Neil 2013

Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 []

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

B. Successful cooperation on border crossing for goods spills over into other areas of relations – it’s the best opportunity to improve relations.
Bonner & Rozental 2009

Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The 1,952-mile land boundary between the United States and Mexico is the place where the most contentious and difficult issues in the bilateral relationship play out – from undocumented migration and contraband trafficking to the allocation of water in a thirsty region. Nevertheless, the border region remains poorly understood – both by policymakers in distant federal capitals and by the public at large. Most people who do not live along the border or cross it frequently are unaware of the challenges of border management or of the ways in which Mexico and the United States are attempting to meet those challenges. Changes on the ground – and local responses to them – frequently outpace both national policies and public perceptions. The conjunction of a technologically advanced, capital-rich society and a modernizing, labor-exporting country creates the potential for both synergy and strife. The challenge confronting Mexico and the United States is to mitigate the conflicts that inevitably arise from this dichotomy while seizing all potential opportunities the differences generate. We envision a system of border management that moves people and goods between the United States and Mexico far more quickly and efficiently than the present arrangement but that also enhances the security of both nations. This new system would facilitate trade, encourage the emergence of regional economic clusters, promote wise stewardship of shared natural resources, and enhance efforts to preserve ecosystems that cross the national boundary. Perhaps most importantly, it would invite communities that dot and span the frontier to exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Ultimately, the border should be as “thin” and transparent as technologically and politically possible for those engaged in legitimate travel or commerce but difficult to penetrate for those engaged in criminal activity or unauthorized transit. Management of this shared boundary should serve as a model for binational collaboration in confronting shared challenges.

C. Plan solves pressures on broader relations questions – it would create the opportunity for a significant increase in US-Mexico relations.
Olson & Lee 2012

Eric L Olson serves as Associate Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Erik Lee serves as Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS) at Arizona State University. “The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region” Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border August 2012 []

Lasting progress in U.S.-Mexico border security can only come from increased bilateral collaboration and independent domestic progress on key issues affecting security in the United States and Mexico. Significant progress has been made in increasing and improving bilateral security collaboration between federal agencies on both sides of the border. While a welcome development, these advances can, in some cases, weakened the long-standing cooperation between local U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies. While it is important to continue strong federal coordination, encouraging local collaboration can also yield significant and important dividends in fighting crime affecting cross-border cities. Improved border management, a challenge during normal fiscal times, is particularly difficult in the United States’ constrained fiscal environment and thus requires increased attention and creative solutions. For example, the two governments —in close collaboration with border communities— should focus their efforts on making the land ports of entry from San Diego to Brownsville as safe and efficient as possible to enhance both our physical and economic security. One such effort has been the highly controversial experimental deployment of the SBInet system on the Arizona-Sonora border. While this technology has been deployed on the border between the ports of entry, the governments have not deployed technology in a game-changing way that could convert the ports of entry themselves into true platforms for economic security rather than highly congested and bureaucratized nodes in our North American commercial network.

D. Growing a strong US-Mexican relationship is a prerequisite to continued US power projection and supremacy.
Pastor 2012

Robert A. Pastor is professor and director of the Center for North American Studies at American University. Pastor served as National Security Advisor on Latin America during the Carter Administration. “Beyond the Continental Divide” From the July/August 2012 issue of __The American Interest__ http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1269

Most Americans think that the largest markets for U.S. exports are China and Japan, and that may explain the Obama Administration’s Asian initiative. But the truth is that Canada and Mexico are the top two markets for U.S. exports. Most Americans also think that Saudi Arabia and Venezuela are the largest sources of our energy imports, but again, Canada and Mexico are more important. And again, we think that most tourists who come and spend money here are European and Asian, but more than half are Canadians and Mexicans. A similar percentage of Americans who travel abroad go to our two neighbors. All in all, no two nations are more important for the U.S. economy than our two closest neighbors. From the perspective of U.S. national security, too, recall for a moment that Mexico and Canada made an historic gamble in signing NAFTA. Already dependent on the behemoth next door and wary of the imbalance of power, both countries feared that NAFTA could make them more vulnerable. Still, they hoped that the United States would be obligated to treat them on an equal and reciprocal basis and that they would prosper from the agreement. Canadians and Mexicans have begun to question whether they made the right choice. There are, of course, a wealth of ways to measure the direct and indirect impact of NAFTA, but political attention, not without justification, tends to focus on violations of the agreement. The U.S. government violated NAFTA by denying Mexican trucks the right to enter the United States for 16 years, relenting in the most timid way, and only after Mexico was permitted by the World Trade Organization to retaliate in October 2011. And for more than a decade, Washington failed to comply with decisions made by a dispute-settlement mechanism regarding imports of soft-wood lumber from Canada. More recently, the United States decided to build a huge wall to keep out Mexicans, and after a three-year process of reviewing the environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline from western Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, this past December 2011 President Obama decided to postpone the decision for another year. This is the sort of treatment likely to drive both Canada and Mexico to conclude that depending on the United States was the wrong decision. Imagine for a moment what might happen if Canada and Mexico came to such a conclusion. Canada might divert its energy exports to China, especially if China guaranteed a long-term relationship at a good price. Mexico would diversify with South America and China and might be less inclined to keep America’s rivals, like Iran, at arm’s length. Is there anyone who thinks these developments would not set off national security alarms? A very old truth would quickly reassert itself: The United States can project its power into Asia, Europe and the Middle East in part because it need not worry about its neighbors. A new corollary of that truth would not be far behind: Canada and Mexico are far more important to the national security of the United States than Iraq and Afghanistan. Beyond the economy and national security, our two neighbors have societal ties to the United States that make all other ethnic connections seem lean in comparison. By 2015, there will be about 35 million people in the United States who were either born in Mexico or whose parents were born in Mexico ; that number exceeds the total population of Canada. Canadians in the United States don’t stand out as much as do Mexicans, but nearly a million Canadians live in the United States. And more Americans live in Mexico than in any other foreign country. In sum, the economy, national security and society of the United States, Mexico and Canada are far more intertwined than most U.S., Canadian and Mexican citizens realize. Most Americans haven’t worried about Mexico in strategic terms since the days of Pancho Villa, or about Canada since the 1814 Battle of Plattsburgh. That’s unwise. Bad relations with either country, let alone both, would be disastrous. On the other hand, deeper relations could be vastly beneficial. We don’t seem ready to recognize that truth either.

E. Loss of American power projection capacity causes global war.
Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption : states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims , and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states —all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics ” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the U nited S tates lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

A. Economic growth in Mexico is necessary to combat growing cartel violence and border insecurity. The plan solves.
Fischler, 2013

Jacob Fischler covers law enforcement, courts and general assignments for The Monitor The Monitor, May 28, 2013 “Mexican trade — and tourists — are boon for U.S. businesses” http://www.themonitor.com/news/local/article_3bf218a2-c734-11e2-b19a-001a4bcf6878.html

A study released earlier this month by NDN, a center-left think-tank based in Washington, D.C., shows trade and tourism between the two countries is at an all-time high. Trade between the two nations in 2012 was estimated at $535 billion. That number is up from $300 billion in 2009, a number that’s projected to double by this year, said Simon Rosenberg, the president of NDN. Texas leads all states with almost $200 billion in imports and exports with Mexico. Trade with Mexico sustains almost 6 million U.S. jobs, the NDN study said. In the Rio Grande Valley, tourists provide the biggest Mexican boost to the economy. “We really rely heavily on the Mexican market,” said Nancy Millar, the director of the McAllen Chamber of Commerce’s Convention and Visitors Bureau. The economic downturn in 2008 — which coincided with a spike in cartel violence — hurt Mexican tourism to the Valley, Millar said. Prior to those phenomena, 35 percent of income to McAllen’s tourism industry came from Mexico, she said, and it remains a vital part of McAllen’s economy. “There’s no doubt we have a much stronger economy than we would without them — 35 percent stronger,” she said. The NDN report called on lawmakers to use the immigration reform bill to increase the number of ports of entry a nd staffing of Customs and Border Protection officers at the border to expedite travel from Mexico to the U.S. “The customs department of (the Department of Homeland Security) is going to have to grow with trade and legal tourism,” Rosenberg said. “We’ve got to invest more in border infrastructure. We’ve got to cut down on wait times .” Doing so would also help eliminate barriers to further trade between the two countries, said Shannon O’Neil, a senior policy fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. And further trade means growing economies on both sides of border, particularly in areas near the border. “When a Ford plant opens in Mexico, it increases employment in the U.S.,” O’Neil said. That is because manufacturing companies take advantage of the free-trade laws that allow easy passage between North American nations to produce different parts in different places for the same finished product. “Up to 40 percent of a product that’s ‘made in Mexico’ actually comes from here originally,” she said. That’s a departure from just 10 to 20 years ago when most Mexican exports to the U.S. were natural resources like gas, she added. But reducing waiting times for Mexican tourists to enter the country is only one part of a formula to further improve trade. Border violence has to be controlled. “What’s been interesting is you’ve seen economic growth in Mexico even as security has worsened,” O’Neil said. But she doesn’t see that trend continuing. “In the long term, I don’t see how prosperity and growth that people hope for can continue if you can’t guarantee safety,” she said. “Economic growth and security have to go hand in hand.” Rosenberg believes economic growth can help bring security. “Improving the economy on both sides of the border has to be seen as part of the strategy to weaken transnational criminal organizations,” he said. “One of the ways to attack the cartels is to show that Mexicans have good jobs.”

B. Specifically, economic effects of alleviating border congestion would decrease illegal immigration to the US.
Bloomberg News May 2013

“Border Delays Cost U.S. $7.8 Billion as Fence Is Focus” By Amanda J. Crawford 5/14/13 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-15/border-delays-cost-u-s-7-8-billion-as-fence-is-focus.html

Delays at U.S.-Mexico border crossings cost the U.S. economy $7.8 billion in 2011, as improvements have lagged behind traffic growth and the political focus has been on securing the rest of the border. The toll could balloon to $14.7 billion annually if the value of U.S.-Mexico truck trade reaches $463 billion by 2020 as predicted, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. As the U.S. Senate debates an overhaul of the nation’s immigration system, the focus on fencing and securing remote stretches of the southern border has overshadowed long-needed improvements in technology, infrastructure and staffing at the land ports, said Matthew Hummer, a senior transportation analyst for Bloomberg Government. “ I think the most important issue here is stabilizing the two economies, and the ports of entry do that: They facilitate trade and create job opportunities ,” said Hummer, the author of a Bloomberg Government report on the border. “ If Mexicans have jobs in Mexico they are less likely to come to the U.S.” Net Mexican migration dropped to zero from 2005 to 2010, amid strengthening economic conditions in Mexico, heightened border enforcement and other factors, according to a Pew Research Center study last year. The Mexican economy has grown at about twice the pace of the U.S. since the end of 2009.

C. Independently, infrastructure development at Mexican border POEs would increase security and decrease illegal immigration by allowing more effective tracking of visa overstays
Roberts, Alden & Whitley 2013

Bryan Roberts is a senior economist at Econometrica, Inc, an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University. Edward Alden is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. John Whitley is an economist, an adjunct lecturer at George Washington University, previously the director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) at DHS, “Managing Illegal Immigration to the United States How Effective Is Enforcement?” May 2013 http://www.cfr.org/immigration/managing-illegal-immigration-united-states/p30658

The land borders remain the biggest challenge in identifying overstays. Exits across the northern border are recorded by the Canadian border authority, and the U.S. and Canadian governments have recently agreed to exchange entry and exit data and are doing so through initial pilot projects. The goal is to share entry and exit data for all border crossings, for Americans and Canadians as well as third-country nationals.60 The southwest land border will soon constitute the sole major issue in visa overstay estimation. The United States and Mexico may be able to negotiate information-sharing arrangements regarding third-country nationals and visa travelers, though infrastructure and data systems remain inadequate at many Mexican ports of entry. This would leave entries and exits on Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), which are used by citizens of Mexico for short-term stays in the border region, as the one remaining challenge for visa overstay estimation. The recording of BCC entries is done electronically, using cards with biometric identifiers, but a huge number of entries is made every year and exits are not tracked. 61 Estimates of the total flow of visa overstayers may thus be sensitive to the estimate of BCC overstayers, and some way of verifying exit of BCC entries needs to be developed, most likely through information-sharing .62

D. Inefficient and ineffective POEs create an open door for a nuclear terrorist attack via a dirty bomb.
McCaul 2012

Michael Thomas McCaul, Sr., U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, serving since 2005. Since the beginning of the 113th Congress, he has been the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. “A LINE IN THE SAND: COUNTERING CRIME, VIOLENCE AND TERROR AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER A MAJORITY REPORT BY THE UNITED STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL T. McCAUL, CHAIRMAN ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION NOVEMBER 2012” http://mccaul.house.gov/uploads/Final%20PDF%20Line%20in%20the%20Sand.pdf

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. n May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations .3 The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter.

E. A dirty bomb smuggled through the border would create a massive border crackdown …
Andreas 2003

Peter Andreas is professor of international studies at the Institute and professor in Brown's Department of Political Science. PhD Cornell, “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada Lines After 9-11” THE CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES Working Paper No. 77 May, 2003

The particular direction taken will obviously depend to a great extent on the location, method, timing, intensity, and frequency of any future terrorist incidents. It is important to note that while the hijackings on 9-11 were not directly linked to the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada borders, they nevertheless had dramatic and long-lasting border ripple effects. A more directly border-related incident, such as terrorists entering the country across the U.S.-Mexico or U.S.-Canada borders, or a bomb exploding that had been smuggled through a border port of entry, would likely generate far more intensive calls for hardening borders. If sustained, a high-intensity border crackdown could potentially stall and even derail the continental economic integration process. There is nothing automatic about the policy reaction to any future attacks, however. The politics of the policy response matter as much as any actual attack. Beyond the actual levels of destruction and disruption that such future terrorist events may cause, U.S. images and perceptions of its NAFTA partners will be crucial. Amongst the many political choices will be whether (and to what extent) American policymakers point an accusatory finger northward and/or southward. Post-9-11 Canadian and Mexican policy initiatives should be viewed as trust- and confidence-building measures designed to inhibit such a response.

F.Nuclear terrorist attack causes retaliation and extinction
Ayson ’10 – Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington (Robert, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether **__nuclear terrorism should__** ever **__be regarded as__** belonging in the category of truly __existential __ threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of **__nuclear terrorism, could precipitate__** a chain of events leading to **__a__** __<span style="font-family: 'Cooper Black',serif;">massive exchange of nuclear weapons __ between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) **__suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors__**. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political **__leaders__** not be tempted to **__assume the worst__** ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, **__the__** U.S. **__president might__** be expected to **__place the country’s__** armed forces, including its **__nuclear arsenal, on__** a **__high__** er stage of **__alert__**. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that **__Moscow and__** /or **__China might mistake__** nly read **__this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use__** force (and possibly **__nuclear force)__** against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) **__Washington might__** decide to **__order a significant__** conventional (or **__nuclear)__** retaliatory or disarming **__attack against__** the leadership of the **__terrorist__** group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, **__Washington__** found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) **__might__** it also **__suspect that they__** secretly **__were in cahoots with the group, increasing__** (again perhaps ever so slightly) **__the chances of a__** __<span style="font-family: 'Cooper Black',serif;">major exchange __. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

A. The plan facilitates improved US-Mexico cooperation while streamlining ports of entry
Bonner & Rozental 2009

Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The solutions ¶ We believe that that the most effective and efficient way to enhance security along ¶ the border is through closer //binational cooperation//. Achieving greater cooperation will ¶ in turn require not only the investment of greater resources but also the creation of ¶ mirror-image law enforcement agencies on each side of the border. Ultimately, ¶ cooperation should take the form of regular binational operations to interdict illegal ¶ flows, joint investigations, constant communication between Mexican and American ¶ authorities at and between the ports of entry. ¶ The violence in many Mexican border towns makes the security situation particularly ¶ urgent. We urge officials in both governments to demonstrate a “bias for action”, ¶ showing as much flexibility and creativity as they can in order to devise new security ¶ arrangements. ¶ The following steps should be taken immediately: ¶ • Mexico should restructure its federal law enforcement institutions along the border ¶ to create a direct counterpart to U.S. border enforcement authorities, similar to the ¶ approach that Canada took after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. ¶ Initially, new personnel operating between the ports of entry should be deployed ¶ along stretches of the border where traffickers are most active. ¶ • Mexico should begin converting its Customs authority into a multi-functional agency ¶ capable of addressing the threats posed by cross-border trafficking of all sorts. ¶ Mexican Customs and the Office of Field Operations of U.S. Customs and Border ¶ Protection (which staffs the ports of entry) should develop joint plans for securing all ¶ land ports of entry along the border. ¶ • Mexico and the U nited S tates should deploy new interdiction and inspection ¶ technologies at the ports of entry. The Mexican side needs an array of new ¶ equipment, including license plate scanners and non-intrusive inspection ¶ technologies. ¶ • The U nited S tates and Mexico should expand cooperative law enforcement efforts ¶ along the border, such as the OASISS program (through which information collected ¶ by U.S. officials is used by Mexican authorities to prosecute smugglers apprehended ¶ in the United States). ¶ • The United States should deny members of drug trafficking organizations and their ¶ families safe haven north of the border by barring family members and known ¶ associates of Mexican criminal organizations from entry into the country; where ¶ these individuals are already in the United States, their visas should be revoked, and ¶ they should be deported. ¶ • The United States should intensify efforts to curtail the smuggling of firearms and ¶ ammunition into Mexico by better monitoring licensed gun sellers, working with them ¶ identify suspicious purchases, regulating gun shows, reinstituting the Clinton-era ban ¶ on assault weapons, conducting targeted inspections of southbound traffic, and ¶ providing leads to a more robust Mexican Customs authority. There should be at ¶ least one ATF agent in each U.S. consulate in Mexico to assist Mexican authorities ¶ with weapons traces and train Mexican law enforcement officers. If warranted by ¶ intelligence, the U.S. should also consider using Joint Inter-Agency Task Force ( JIATF) ¶ -South resources to interdict international arms smuggling into North America. ¶ • The United States should improve coordination between U.S. law enforcement ¶ agencies to seize bulk cash flowing south to Mexico and conduct targeted, ¶ intelligence-driven inspections of southbound traffic. The Federal Bureau of ¶ Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs ¶ Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key roles in increasing ¶ the amount of southbound drug cash seized. ¶ • The U nited S tates should dramatically expand assistance to Mexico beyond the ¶ Mérida Initiative, in order to help Mexico build up its law enforcement capacity. The ¶ U.S. government should be prepared to spend $300-500 million per year for at least ¶ five years. ¶ • The United States should reduce demand for illegal drugs through enhanced ¶ prevention efforts, increased access to treatment programs, stricter street-level ¶ enforcement, expanded drug testing of a portion of the workforce (e.g., employees ¶ of firms with government contracts), and more careful surveillance of the prison and ¶ parolee populations. Mexico should also intensify its own efforts to reduce domestic ¶ drug consumption. ¶ The following steps should be taken within the next three years: ¶ • Mexico should complete the establishment of a federal frontier police, either as a ¶ division of an existing entity or as a new agency dedicated to securing the areas ¶ between the ports of entry on both Mexico’s northern and southern borders. In the ¶ north, zones of operation for the Mexican force should exactly match those of its U.S. ¶ counterpart. ¶ • Mexico should consider bringing the federal frontier police and a transformed ¶ Customs authority together into a single, unified border protection agency. ¶ • Mexico and the U nited S tates should reconfigure the zones of operation of their ¶ respective border enforcement agencies so that they mirror each other. ¶ • Cross-deputized Mexican and U.S. agents should conduct joint operations between ¶ the ports of entry. ¶ • Mexico and the U nited S tates should reconfigure their ports of entry so that ¶ appropriate officials on both sides have access to real-time data on vehicles and ¶ individuals crossing the border. Customs officers from both sides should meet ¶ regularly to review operations at their ports of entry. ¶ • Professional and trusted law enforcement personnel from both countries should be ¶ able to search for information gathered on perpetrators by officials from the other ¶ country. ¶ • Mexico and the U.S. should build a binational prison on Mexican soil, to house ¶ Mexicans who have been apprehended by U.S. authorities for relatively minor ¶ border-related crimes. Such a facility would allow these individuals to be closer to ¶ their families while they serve their time. ¶ • Both countries should establish workable systems for preventing corruption, including ¶ careful background checks and vetting of applicants, as well as a system for rapidly ¶ identifying corrupt overtures and promptly and professionally investigating all ¶ potential corruption allegations. ¶ • Mexico should re-civilianize law enforcement. As civilian authorities become more ¶ capable and professional, it should be possible for the Mexican government to ¶ withdraw military personnel from most places where they have had to assume ¶ police functions. On the U.S. side, better control over the border should obviate the ¶ need for National Guard units currently deployed near the frontier to assist U.S. ¶ Customs and Border Protection.

B. Mexico is a ready and willing partner for border infrastructure improvements, but the United States has to be the first mover – plan would catalyze growth in legal trade
O’Neil 2013

Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “Mexico Makes It: A Transformed Society, Economy, and Government” March/April 2013 __Foreign Affairs__ http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexico-makes/p30098

BORDER BUDDIES Since NAFTA was passed, U.S.-Mexican trade has more than tripled. Well over $1 billion worth of goods crosses the U.S.-Mexican border every day, as do 3,000 people, 12,000 trucks, and 1,200 railcars. Mexico is second only to Canada as a destination for U.S. goods, and sales to Mexico support an estimated six million American jobs, according to a report published by the Woodrow Wilson International Center's Mexico Institute. The composition of that bilateral trade has also changed in recent decades. Approximately 40 percent of the products made in Mexico today have parts that come from the United States. Many consumer goods, including cars, televisions, and computers, cross the border more than once during their production. Admittedly, this process has sent some U.S. jobs south, but overall, cross-border production is good for U.S. employment. There is evidence that U.S. companies with overseas operations are more likely to create domestic jobs than those based solely in the United States. Using data collected confidentially from thousands of large U.S. manufacturing firms, the scholars Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James Hines upended the conventional wisdom in a 2008 study, which found that when companies ramp up their investment and employment internationally, they invest more and hire more people at home, too. Overseas operations make companies more productive and competitive, and with improved products, lower prices, and higher sales, they are able to create new jobs everywhere. Washington should welcome the expansion of U.S. companies in Mexico because increasing cross-border production and trade between the two countries would boost U.S. employment and growth. Mexico is a ready, willing, and able economic partner, with which the United States has closer ties than it does with any other emerging-market country. Familial and communal ties also unite the United States and Mexico. The number of Mexican immigrants in the United States doubled in the 1980s and then doubled again in the 1990s. Fleeing poor economic and employment conditions in Mexico and attracted by labor demand and family and community members already in the United States, an estimated ten million Mexicans have come north over the past three decades. This flow has recently slowed, thanks to changing demographics and economic improvements in Mexico and a weakening U.S. economy. Still, some 12 million Mexicans and over 30 million Mexican Americans call the United States home. For all these reasons, the United States should strengthen its relationship with its neighbor, starting with immigration laws that support the binational individuals and communities that already exist in the United States and encourage the legal immigration of Mexican workers and their families. U.S. President Barack Obama has promised to send such legislation to Congress, but a strong anti-immigrant wing within the Republican Party and the slow U.S. economic recovery pose significant barriers to a comprehensive and far-reaching deal. Nevertheless, the United States and Mexico urgently need to invest in border infrastructure, standardize their customs forms, and work to better facilitate legal trade between them. Furthermore, getting Americans to recognize the benefits of cross-border production will be an uphill battle, but it is one worth fighting in order to boost the United States' exports, jobs, and overall economic growth.

C. Expanding border crossing would pose no risk to security – minor investments on expediting flows would reap massive economic returns
Bonner & Rozental 2009

Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

Congestion at crossing points imposes considerable costs on tourists, commuters, consumers, business owners, and border communities; the financial price alone of delays at the border reaches billions of dollars per year. In some areas along the border, including the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, expediting cross-border commerce is the single most important measure that the governments could take to promote economic development. Although facilitation is often viewed as the flip side of security, there are ways to simultaneously expedite trade and improve security. For instance, new detection technologies and intelligent risk management strategies enhance public safety while facilitating cross-border travel and commerce. One crucial barrier to trade facilitation is the deficit in border infrastructure, which simply has not kept pace with massive increases in trade and transit since ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Federal spending on ports of entry would have a very high rate of return; for this reason, both countries should make a long-term commitment to fund border infrastructure and (in the short run) disproportionately direct stimulus money toward the ports of entry. Even with additional stimulus spending, however, federal funding will remain insufficient to address the infrastructure deficit; both countries must find other sources of financing for border crossing points and the roads that feed into them. This money can come in part from the private sector, with the market rather than the state determining the magnitude of private investment in border infrastructure. Beyond infrastructure, better exploitation of technology, refined risk-based segmentation of traffic, and operational changes at the ports of entry (including staffing) can all reduce transit time. Because the marginal cost of operating an existing port of entry is extremely low compared to both the cost of building a new port of entry and the marginal benefit of more rapid transit, inadequate staffing of the ports of entry should never become a bottleneck So far neither government has articulated a goal for wait times. The Task Force believes that average wait times at the border should not exceed 20 minutes in either direction, at any port of entry, with minimal variation about this average.

D. Plan solves border security – the majority of illegal immigration and illicit trafficking happens at legitimate POEs
Wilson 2013

Christopher E. Wilson Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. “Focus immigration security on official border crossings” __Dallas Morning News__ April 11 http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/latest-columns/20130411-christopher-wilson-focus-immigration-security-on-official-border-crossings.ece?action=reregister

As the senatorial Gang of Eight finalizes its immigration reform bill, it has become clear that border security will be a key, if contentious, part of any viable immigration proposal. In fact, it remains one of the few sticking points with the potential to derail the whole reform process. Yet despite having so much riding on improving border security, there is no clear definition of the term. ¶ Statistics about drug smuggling, aspiring terrorists and unauthorized immigrants are naturally difficult to collect. In the absence of clear metrics to guide our border strategy and funding, we have given ever more resources to the Border Patrol, which operates in the areas between official border crossings. Comparatively little attention has been paid to the staffing, infrastructure and technology needs of ports of entry themselves, both leaving them less secure and undermining America’s economic competitiveness in the process. ¶ A close reading of the senators’ framework gives the impression that the next round of strengthening border security might look a lot like previous rounds. That would be a mistake. Staffing and budgets for areas between the ports of entry have doubled since 2004 and are now at a level where even major increases would produce only marginal security gains. ¶ Instead, greater attention should be placed on improving security and efficiency at official border crossings, where the greatest security risks actually are. Almost half of all unauthorized immigrants in the United States entered through official ports of entry with visas, only to lose legal status when their visas expired. Intelligence reports suggest that most hard drugs, like cocaine and methamphetamine, are trafficked through, rather than around, the official border crossings. While it is hard to predict the future strategies of terrorists, it is worth noting that all of the 9/11 attackers entered the U.S. through official ports of entry — though none at the U.S.-Mexico border. ¶ One way to make ports of entry better at blocking dangerous traffic while letting legitimate travelers and commerce through quickly would be to increase participation in trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs. It is a problem of needles and haystacks. With over a half-million people and a billion dollars’ worth of goods crossing the border with Mexico each day, there is a whole lot of haystack in which dangerous individuals and shipments can hide. ¶ Trusted programs (SENTRI for individuals, FAST for commercial vehicles) expedite the passage of vetted, low-risk travelers and shippers so that law enforcement can focus its limited resources on the unknown and suspicious traffic. Despite the fact that the vast majority of border crossers do so regularly, only 18 percent of individuals use the express lanes available to vetted trusted travelers, suggesting the potential for such programs is much greater than their current level of use. ¶ Investments in port of entry infrastructure and technology are also needed. Strengthening the capacity to identify crossers with certainty using biometrics like fingerprints, iris scans or facial recognition would prevent lookalikes from fraudulently using someone else’s passport or visa. Inadequate infrastructure currently causes long lineups at the border, which encourages officials to rush the screening process and possibly miss suspicious crossers while increasing the risk that drugs or other illegal goods could be planted in idled vehicles. ¶ It also makes sense to inspect cargo and target criminal groups long before they get to the border when possible. Intelligence-driven law enforcement is generally much more effective than simply patrolling the border and performing random inspections because it targets resources on the individuals, organizations, geographic areas, travel routes and patterns of behavior that represent the greatest risks. We need strong cooperation and information sharing across borders and among federal, state and local government agencies and law enforcement.

Intervention K
Politics DA China DA Cards on all advantages (Democracy has hardliners on it)